Falling into the Canadian Lap:
The Confederation of
Newfoundland and Canada,
1945-1949

By:
Melvin Baker

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The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Royal Commission on Renewing and Strengthening Our Place in Canada.
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Introduction

This paper provides an overview of the events and processes of the late 1940s that led to Newfoundland’s Confederation with Canada on March 31, 1949. It is based on the current historical literature which owes a considerable debt to the recent excellent books on Newfoundland in this period by historians Peter Neary and David MacKenzie. Both historians provided detailed analyses of Newfoundland’s entry into the Canadian Confederation using primary documentation from British, Canadian, American and Newfoundland archival sources.

Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World

In the 1869 general election, Newfoundlanders rejected political union with the Canadian Confederation that had been established two years earlier. Instead, Newfoundlanders turned their attention to strengthening their economy and maintaining their political independence.1 Confederation remained an issue just beneath the political surface in Newfoundland politics, but it was an issue politicians dare not declare their public support for. Indeed, one of the best ways to smear one’s political opponent was to label that person a “Confederate.” Sir Robert Bond, Prime Minister from 1900 to 1909, epitomizes most clearly this independence stance and his active political career from 1882 to 1914 was devoted to championing Newfoundland’s independent nationhood.2 That is not to say that Confederate politicians such as the Canadian-born Alfred Morine3 were not active in local politics; however, they were unable to reach the top prize of Prime Minister on the basis of this obvious political stance.

Until 1934, Newfoundland pursued its own development strategy modeled on Canada’s policy of railway development to open up the mineral and timber resources of the interior of the Island. The result was a huge development debt due to railway construction and maintenance, exacerbated by expenditures during the First World War and loans in the 1920s raised for public works expenditures.4

In 1934, Newfoundland was still predominantly a society of small fishing outports: there were 1,292 settlements along the coast, only 100 of them with populations of more than 500. St. John’s, the capital, had 39,886 inhabitants in 1935. The fishery still employed 40 per cent of the male labour force. Wage labour was found in the paper-making towns of Grand Falls and Corner Brook; in the mining centres of Bell Island, Buchans and St. Lawrence; and in St. John’s where there was a small civil service, some secondary manufacturing, and a sizable labour force involved in marine-related industries.

The world depression, beginning in 1929, struck hard. Total exports fell in value from $40 million in 1930 to $23 million in 1933. The number of people receiving “the dole”, or able-bodied relief, of six cents a day rose sharply. During the winter of 1932-33, one quarter of the population depended on the government for the necessities of tea, flour, pork and molasses. Decreased revenues and increased expenditures on relief created a debt crisis for the government. In 1933, for instance, about 65 per cent of government revenues went to pay the annual interest charge on the debt. The debt had grown rapidly from $43 million in 1920-21 to $98.5 million in 1933.5
Thus, the constitutional change in 1934 had grown out of the financial problems Newfoundland had found itself in in the 1930s when it was unable to meet the interest payments on the public debt. When retrenchments in the civil service failed to help, in 1932 the Administration of Frederick Alderdice agreed to a British-Canadian suggestion that a royal commission be established to suggest ways for the island to meet its debt obligations and to plan its economic reorganization. The result was a recommendation from the subsequent Newfoundland Royal Commission chaired by Lord Amulree, a Scottish lawyer and former labour politician, that the 1855 constitution be suspended. What Newfoundland needed, the Commission reported on October 4, 1933 to the British House of Commons, was a respite from parliamentary politics until it was again self-supporting financially. Faced with the alternative of default, on November 28, 1933 the Dominion of Newfoundland asked the British government to replace the existing elected government by an appointed Commission. The British government never set a time limit for how long the Commission would govern nor did it define what the criteria for “self-supporting” was.

The charge by the Amulree Commission that Newfoundland politics were corrupt was highly unfair; they were no more so than Canadian politics (if that was any consolation for the Newfoundland people). But in corruption, the inquiry had found an easy justification for the suspension of democracy. Had the inquiry focused more closely on the real cause of Newfoundland’s economic problems – the international depression – its case for the abolition of Responsible Government would have been harder to make out.

**Commission of Government**

On February 16, 1934 the British-appointed Commission assumed office consisting of three Newfoundlanders – Frederick Alderdice, William Howley, and John Puddester – and three Britons – Thomas Lodge, Sir John Hope Simpson, and E.N.R. Trentham – and a British governor, Sir David Murray Anderson. The Commission had full legislative and executive powers. Its proceedings were subject only to the supervisory control of the British government, with the Governor-in-Commission being responsible to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. Britain assumed financial responsibility for the Commission, which until 1940 only managed to balance its budget through grants-in-aid from the Treasury. In their financial management of Newfoundland, however, the Commissioners were also greatly assisted by the conversion in 1934 of the Island’s outstanding debt issues into bonds guaranteed by Britain at a lower interest rate, thus saving some two million dollars in interest charges each year. It would have some notable achievements during its tenure from 1934 to 1949, especially in the much-needed areas of social welfare and public health. The Commissioners saw their principal task as the delivery of efficient government without being bound by the political and religious practices, which, in the past, had characterized government in general and the civil service in particular.

The early popular expectations associated with the constitutional change in 1934 gave way by the late 1930s to growing public disenchantment with the Commission, particularly in St. John’s. When the Commission was established, many people expected that it would have easy access to large sums of funds from the Treasury for economic development and that British
capitalists would rush to invest their money in Newfoundland. However, the Commissioners gave the people more efficient government but not any substantial improvement in their standard of living. Consequently, in August 1939 a committee of prominent St. John’s citizens was formed to work for the return of Responsible Government, but the outbreak of war in Europe and the Commission’s mobilization of the Island’s human and natural resources for Britain’s war effort served to silence the Commission’s critics.8

Atlantic Bastion in Defence of the Atlantic Triangle

With the coming of war, prosperity returned to Newfoundland and the unemployment and poor relief levels dropped drastically. The new-found wealth was the result of large expenditures by American and Canadian military personnel who built military bases on the Island to defend North America. In 1940-1941 the Commission of Government recorded a surplus budget for the first time, previous deficits having been met by grants from the Treasury. Indeed, Newfoundland was now in a position to make interest-free loans available to Britain. By 1945 these loans amounted to $12,300,000.

Newfoundlanders enthusiastically answered their Mother Country’s appeal for a call to arms and enlisted in the British and Canadian armed forces. Newfoundland also supplied two artillery regiments to British units and an Overseas Forestry Unit which worked in Scotland. However, Newfoundland’s true importance to the Allied war effort lay in its strategic location as a defence base in the North Atlantic for North America. Both Canada and the United States acted to protect their national interests by establishing bases in Newfoundland. A major security concern for Canada in Newfoundland was the safety of the Bell Island mines which supplied iron to the Sydney steel industry. This industry accounted for 30 per cent of Canada’s total iron ore needs.

Through a series of defence agreements reached with the Commission, Canada established several installations in Newfoundland that cost over $65 million to construct. These included air bases at Torbay and Goose Bay, and a naval base in St. John’s for which the British Admiralty provided funding. In total, the number of Canadian garrison troops stationed in Newfoundland peaked at nearly 6,000 army personnel in 1943, but this figure does not, of course, include the thousands of seamen in the naval convoy duty operating out of St. John’s and the airmen stationed in Gander and Goose Bay.9

American military involvement in Newfoundland resulted from the signing by the United States and Britain of the Leased Bases Agreement of 1941. Under it, the United States received permission to establish military bases in Newfoundland for a tenure of 99 years. Major facilities built by the Americans included bases in St. John’s, Argentia and Stephenville. At Argentia, in what historian Peter Neary has described as “what must surely be counted the ultimate act of resettlement in Newfoundland’s long twentieth century experience of this experience,” not only was the entire community of people moved to nearby communities, but the remains of 625 individuals were exhumed from an Argentia graveyard and moved to a new cemetery in nearby Freshwater.10 The Americans also shared with the Canadians use of the Gander and Goose Bay installations. American expenditures for construction purposes by 1943 totaled
$105,000,000, while the number of military personnel stationed in Newfoundland peaked in 1943 at 10,900.

There was now employment for all who wished to work; there was such a shortage of labour that the Island’s paper mills at Grand Falls and Corner Brook had to reduce newspaper production in 1943 and 1944 for several months. At Bell Island the iron ore company in 1943 temporarily reduced the size of its labour force and likewise reduced production. The Newfoundlanders working on the bases never received wage parity with their American civilian counterparts, because the Commission had decided not to allow wages to be driven up in other industries as a consequence. The Commission also banned labour strikes and lockouts and imposed compulsory arbitration on the labour scene. In 1942 the Commission organized the Labour Relations Office to set up a national employment registration scheme. This office subsequently proved especially effective in protecting the interests of labourers recruited by Canadian businesses for mainland wartime employment, the Canadians agreeing to terms of employment set by the office. In such matters, the interests of the Canadian Government and the Commission of Government superseded the interests of Newfoundland workers.

**Omission of Government?**

As far as Newfoundlanders were concerned by the early 1940s, their country had become self-supporting. The newly found financial strength prompted many Newfoundlanders, especially some St. John’s community leaders, again to think earnestly of their constitutional future. In June 1942 the St. John’s Board of Trade, for instance, called on the Commission to recognize the need for it to consult a public body of representative citizens in governing the country. Expressed in vague and general terms, the Board’s proposal called for some kind of formal procedures to debate public opinion. This view was endorsed by St. John’s businessman and journalist Albert Perlin, a member of the Board’s governing council, in his *Daily News* “Wayfarer” column. Perlin believed that Newfoundland could sustain itself financially as an independent country if the government would accept having expert advisers in economics and finance. In another column, he attacked the Commission for not realizing that it was a “stop-gap” measure and was never intended to be a permanent system. He castigated the Commission for doing nothing at all “to prepare the people for assumption of the responsibilities of self-government.” “It seems more concerned with getting a pat on the back from the Dominions Office,” he continued in May 1942, “than catering to the natural democratic instincts of the people.” In another column he called on the Commission to provide better political education of the people because within the “past eight years enough people have come of voting age to swing an election one way or the other and hardly one of them knows anything about self-government or its responsibilities and duties.” The Commission’s “complete indifference” to this matter, Perlin believed, was the aspect “in which the Commission... has proved itself an utter and complete failure.”

Ironically, in view of his later political beliefs, radio broadcaster Joseph Smallwood, as editor of the short-lived newspaper *The Express*, in 1941 satirized the Commission of Government in a series of articles that drew the ire of the Commissioners. They were the
The British Waypoint to Confederation

In early 1942 the British government under its Dominions Secretary, Clement Attlee, initiated deliberations on Newfoundland’s constitutional future. The view of his senior officials was that Newfoundland’s destiny lay within the Canadian Confederation and British policy should be formulated to help achieve this goal. Atlee remained uncommitted and visited Newfoundland in September 1942 to get a first-hand view. His findings were that Britain should continue the Commission system of government until the end of the war, when there would be a strong local demand for a return to self-government. Thus, it was important that Britain prepare the ground for constitutional change which would be one of three choices: a continuation of the existing system; self-government; or a constitutional “half way house” with Britain retaining some financial control. Confederation was considered unacceptable because there was no public support in 1942 in either Canada or Newfoundland for this option. He acknowledged that a “contract” had been made with the people of Newfoundland whereby a general demand from the people for self-government would have to be acknowledged.

Attlee appointed a fact-finding mission consisting of three British MPs, Charles Ammon, Sir Derek Gunston, and Alan Herbert, the so-called Goodwill Mission, that visited Newfoundland during the summer of 1943. The commission traveled the Island and Labrador, taking the views of residents. Their report to the British government was that a vote should be held in Newfoundland on its constitutional future following the end of war. The British government accepted this recommendation and on December 2, 1943 announced that after the end of the war the necessary machinery would be provided to allow the Newfoundland people to decide their constitutional future. P.V. Emrys-Evans, parliamentary secretary for the Dominions Office, told the British House of Commons that “there is no desire on the part of the Government to impose any particular solution. The government will be decided by the freely expressed views of the people. It is for Newfoundland to make the choice, and the Government, with the assent of Parliament, will be ready to give effect to their wishes.” Newfoundlanders would have the final word as to their political future, but the British “had left themselves considerable leeway.”

Further consultations on how the vote would be held followed between the Commission of Government and officials of the Dominions Office. As Peter Neary has noted, the British government subsequently worked “within the four corners of this declaration” and that “by the time they had to invoke the procedure for constitutional review promised in 1943, they had come to favour strongly and were promoting actively a decision by Newfoundlanders in favour of Confederation.” They did so because of the huge costs associated with a proposed post-war reconstruction program the Commission of Government had drawn up for Newfoundland. This program in September 1944 was projected to cost $100 million for economic development, communications, social programs and government buildings.

When this reconstruction program was submitted to the Treasury, the Dominions Office was informed that it never had the funds and Britain would have to borrow heavily itself from...
Canada for its own post-war reconstruction purposes as Britain was facing a dollar shortage crisis. Moreover, John Keynes of Treasury advised the British government that the “right long-term solution is for Newfoundland to be taken over by Canada. The argument seems to be that the Newfoundlanders will overcome their reluctance to leave us and put themselves in the hands of Canada if we give them these great sums. It would have been natural to conclude the exact opposite, namely that, after this signal mark of our favour, the Newfoundlanders would be still more reluctant to part company with us.”

In July 1944 the Dominions Office appointed Corner Brook Magistrate Nehemiah Short to examine how an elected body, or a national convention, could be elected once the war ended. He recommended that members be elected by secret ballot based generally on the Redistribution Act of 1925. He also recommended that any candidate would have to be a voter and a resident of the district for which that person sought election, a move designed to prevent the past practice where St. John’s residents predominantly used their influence to win elections in outport districts.

On December 11, 1945 Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee informed the British Parliament that the following year Newfoundlanders would elect a National Convention of 45 delegates, each of whom would have to be resident for two years in a district in which they would seek election. This Convention would examine and debate the changes that had taken place in the financial and economic situation of the country since 1934, and second, make recommendations to the British Government concerning the various forms of government that could be put before the people in a national referendum. The delegates would “consider and discuss among themselves, as elected representatives of the people, the changes that have taken place in the financial and economic situation of the Island since 1934, and bearing in mind the extent to which the high revenues of recent years have been due to wartime conditions, to examine the position of the country and to make recommendations to His Majesty’s government as to possible forms of future government to be put before the people at a national referendum.” In summary, the National Convention would make its recommendations to the British government and the people would then vote on their constitutional future in a referendum.

**Enter the Canadian Wolf**

Canadian interest in Newfoundland during the early 1940s had evolved initially from strategic concerns about its national defense and the need to protect its future basing rights in Newfoundland. In 1941 it opened a High Commissioner’s Office at St. John’s, a “tactful Confederate outpost,” to safeguard Canada’s growing military interests in Newfoundland and to promote generally Canadian interests in Newfoundland. The first High Commissioner was Charles Burchell, who quietly sounded out prominent St. John’s citizens on Confederation and quietly encouraged St. John’s lawyer John McEvoy to promote publicly Confederation between the two countries. Canadian interest would also be prompted by the economic potential of Labrador’s resources, especially its potential iron ore reserves in western Labrador which Canadian government officials were well aware of by 1944. Canada in 1947 would keep...
knowledge of its discovery by a Canadian company secret so Newfoundlanders would not be adversely influenced in their perception of Canada.  

Canada had no formal policy towards Newfoundland’s constitutional future, other than Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s 1943 public statement that “if the people of Newfoundland should ever decide that they wish to enter the Canadian federation, and should make that decision clear beyond all possibility of understanding, Canada would give most sympathetic consideration to the proposal.”  His statement was in response to a question in the House of Commons from Joseph Noseworthy, a Newfoundland-born Toronto school teacher and MP for York South. The Canadian response was carefully noted in the Dominions Office; in November 1943 the Canadian Department of External Affairs under Robert MacKay commenced a re-examination of its policy towards Newfoundland and Newfoundland’s future economic prospects. MacKay concluded that Confederation would protect Canada’s interests in defence and civil aviation, but Newfoundland would be an economic and political liability as a province.  

The Canadian government had been careful about declaring its specific intentions to the British government. As historian James Hiller has observed, Canada was cautious because Britain first had to declare what it intended to do with Newfoundland. And, second, Canada recognized that many Newfoundlanders in 1943-44 were evidently adamantly opposed to Confederation and there was little to gain for Canada to raise the subject, although there was strong support, especially among the “educated and informed” for it. In January 1944 the Canadian government transferred Hugh Keenleyside, a Confederate supporter, to St. John’s as Acting High Commissioner to examine Newfoundland’s political and economic situation. The British government regarded his temporary assignment as a signal that the Canadians were taking Newfoundland “much more serious than they have in the past.”  

The British now promoted the notion that Canada’s growing interest in Newfoundland was a natural progress of events. The problem was that Newfoundlanders were not interested in Confederation; Canadian High Commissioner Burchell and Canadian senior officials at the Department of External Affairs believed that the restoration of Responsible Government in some form might have to occur before Newfoundlanders made a decision about joining Canada. The matter at hand for the British government was how to get Newfoundlanders to consider Confederation as a viable constitutional option if the Canadians were interested.

**Convergence of Interests**

In November 1944 Britain’s Dominions Office and Treasury had prepared a historical summary of Canada-Newfoundland relations. In their view, Canada had traditionally regarded Newfoundland with “detachment, condescension, and even contempt,” believing that Newfoundland was too small to remain an independent country and eventually would “fall into ... the Canadian lap.” While Canada had regarded Newfoundland as a financial liability, Newfoundlanders since their rejection of Confederation in 1869 had remained determined to maintain their independence outside the Canadian nation. “The effect of the war,” historian Peter Neary has observed, had been “to change Canadian but not Newfoundland attitudes. Canada had finally come to see that Newfoundland’s ‘full partnership’ was necessary not only
for her own security but to round off Confederation." The presence of large numbers of American servicemen, and the more favorable impression they left on the population than had Canadian servicemen, had convinced the Canadian government that it was in its best interest to work towards greater co-operation so that Confederation would be in the best interests of both countries.

In mid-1945 Associate Under-Secretary Hume Wrong of the Department of External Affairs informed Dominions Office Secretary Lord Cranborne at a meeting in San Francisco that Canada “would not be very happy” if Newfoundland was put “in so stable a financial position that all incentive for her to join Canada was removed.” Canadian and British interests finally converged in September 1945 when a senior Dominions Office official, P.A. Clutterbuck, visited Ottawa to secure Canadian financial support for the proposed Newfoundland reconstruction program and met with three senior officials of the Department and with the Canadian High Commissioner to Newfoundland, James Scott Macdonald. Clutterbuck was well versed in Newfoundland affairs, having first served in 1933 as Secretary to the Newfoundland Royal Commission. This was a critical meeting on the road to Confederation.

Canada was not willing to provide any financial assistance to the proposed reconstruction program for Newfoundland. There was simply little public or political interest in Canada for Newfoundland affairs. Instead, Canadian officials asked what Britain’s response would be to Canada welcoming a recommendation from the National Convention for Confederation. Clutterbuck replied that Britain considered Newfoundland’s “natural destiny” to be Confederation with Canada. His discussions with the Canadians then turned to Newfoundland’s financial status as a province. The general consensus was that Newfoundland could meet current expenditures out of the normal provincial revenue sources, but that Canada would consider Newfoundland’s inclusion as rounding off Confederation, a factor that made concern over balancing the balance sheet a secondary issue. In this and subsequent discussions with the British, the Canadians made it clear that the initiative for Confederation would have to come from Newfoundlanders themselves and the Canadian government “would do the handsome thing by them,” Prime Minister King in 1945 told the British High Commissioner to Canada, Malcolm MacDonald.

The British government was in the process of divesting itself of its overseas colonies and regarded “union with Canada as the objective to be aimed at” while leaving Newfoundland to be constrained by the financial and geographical aspects of its own situation. As Lord Addison, the new Dominions Office Secretary advised his fellow British cabinet members on October 18, 1945: “It would, of course, be most important that no hint that this is the solution which we envisage should be allowed to come out either here or in Newfoundland. The initiative must be left entirely to Newfoundlanders, and we must take care to avoid any appearance of seeking to influence them in any way. At the same time, we must say or do nothing which would conflict with this objective or make it harder to achieve.”

On December 11, 1945 Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee informed the British Parliament that the following year Newfoundlanders would elect a National Convention of delegates. How to influence Newfoundland public opinion “behind the scenes” became a delicate balancing act for the Canadian and British governments over the next few years. The British government tempered this announcement with the declaration that its ability to provide future financial assistance to an independent Newfoundland would be severely limited. As historian James Hiller has noted, this was a calculated gamble for the British government;
it hoped that the forthcoming referendum would lead to Confederation, a political option, the Canadian government informed the Dominions Office, that was increasing in popularity. In May 1946 Britain appointed a new Governor for Newfoundland, Sir Gordon Macdonald, a friend of Attlee and one who fully supported Attlee’s preference that Newfoundland join the Canadian Confederation.

The Streets of Montreal

A prospective Confederate leader was about to position himself for the forthcoming election to the National Convention. Forty-five year old Joseph R. Smallwood was a pig farmer from Gander who was, at various phases of his life, a labour leader, journalist, and radio host. It was on a business trip to Montreal in late 1945 concerning a piggery, which he had operated at Gander since 1943, that Smallwood read in the Montreal Gazette of Britain’s proposed plans for Newfoundland’s constitutional future. Walking the streets of Montreal for hours on December 11, 1945 an excited Smallwood debated what political options Newfoundlanders should adopt. He became determined to be part of the forthcoming political campaign – “all of my work and my training up to that moment made my entry inevitable” he later recalled – but he was not sure what he preferred other than it was not to be a continuation of Commission of Government. Memories of a conversation with Gordon Bradley in 1930, in which the latter claimed that Confederation was the only salvation for Newfoundland, prompted Smallwood to consider Confederation as a viable political option for his beleaguered country. He was now a Confederate.

Returning to Gander the following day on a RAF bomber, he immediately decided to update his knowledge of recent Canadian political developments. He wrote the Canadian Prime Minister and the nine provincial Premiers for information on federal-provincial relations, having decided that he would stand as a candidate for election to the National Convention. The materials poured in with Smallwood assiduously mastering the workings of the Canadian federal system. In March 1946 he wrote a series of 11 articles to the Daily News arguing the merits of Confederation. To raise funds for his forthcoming election campaign, he borrowed $3,000 from Chesley Crosbie and bought from the Canadian government 3,000 grey woollen blankets which he resold to the Bowater paper company for $6,000. With his share of the profit, he financed his campaign for Bonavista Centre in which Gander was situated.

Election to the National Convention took place on June 21, 1946 and voters returned 45 delegates. Voter turnout in St. John’s was high, but in the rest of the country turnout was light with eight candidates being elected by acclamation. All elected delegates were male with two women having failed to win election. Among the 45 delegates was a representative from Labrador, the first time that region ever had its own representation in a local elected body. Smallwood, who had been resident in Gander since 1943, struck a responsive chord among voters winning the district with 2,129 votes as compared to 277 for his opponent and becoming the only avowed Confederate elected openly to the Convention. Smallwood’s move to Gander had indeed been fortuitous, despite the assertions of some later supporters of responsible government that Smallwood had prior knowledge of the residency qualification that would be needed for election to the National Convention.
In August 1946 the newly elected delegate visited Ottawa to become acquainted with senior servants and politicians. Smallwood made his own appointments with senior civil servants. Among those he met with were Robert MacKay and Jack Pickersgill, Special Assistant to Prime Minister King. While Ottawa and King did not wish to appear too anxious, Smallwood’s visit effectively left him with the impression that the Canadians would seriously entertain an overture of political union with Newfoundland on satisfactory terms. The visit steeled Smallwood’s determination that Confederation could be achieved; Newfoundlanders had now to be as convinced as he was of its benefits.

The Barrelman of Confederation

As Smallwood quickly asserted himself as a major Confederate leader, it is best to remember what his political standing was before the National Convention opened for business. He did not evidently see himself initially as the leader of a pro-Confederate faction in 1946. Prior to his election campaign in February 1946 he had suggested to Gordon Bradley (elected for the district of Bonavista East) that a member of the St. John’s elite, Sir John Puddester (Commissioner for Public Health and Welfare and a former cabinet minister under Prime Minister Alderdice) be made leader. Bradley discouraged Smallwood of this notion believing that the time was not right to form such a party. There were other Convention delegates who shared Smallwood’s support for Confederation, but who were prepared to go slow on publicly pushing the issue. These delegates included Bradley who agreed, prior to the opening of the Convention, that should Confederation be successful then Smallwood would be Premier and he a federal Minister. Despite the cautionary advice from Bradley, Smallwood quickly made Confederation a matter of constant debate at the Convention and he became the leader in the public’s mind of the Confederate cause. With the experience gained from his Barrelman radio days as well as the oratorical skills refined over 30 years of public debate and speech making, he was able to appeal directly to outport Newfoundlanders to extol the virtues of Confederation. This appeal became especially effective when the Commission in October 1946 approved the taping of debate in the Convention for rebroadcast over the government radio station. A minority in the Convention, the Confederates quickly gravitated to the dynamic leadership of Smallwood. He had grasped the idea of Confederation with Canada as the only means of giving outport Newfoundlanders “a half decent chance in life” consisting of “North American standards of public services” which would be available through the Canadian welfare system. Through the Convention’s broadcasting of its proceedings over the public radio system, Smallwood continuously emphasized these benefits, which found sympathetic hearing in cash-poor outport communities. Social and economic change in Newfoundland had become associated with the notion of Confederation with Canada.

The influence of the minority Confederates in the Convention received a further boost following the death on November 16, 1946 of Convention Chair Cyril Fox. Although the Commission of Government had the right of appointment, the Convention members quickly asserted their claim to appoint a successor by nominating Bradley for Chair. The Commission consulted the Dominions Office and then amended the National Convention Act that required that the Chair be a judge of the Supreme Court. Bradley assumed the office of Chair on
December 11, 1946 and retained his right to vote as an elected member.\textsuperscript{57} His appointment reflected his seniority among the members of the Convention; it also reflected the confidence of the anti-Confederates of their ability to control the proceedings of the Convention.\textsuperscript{68}

### The Political Maverick

The election of a National Convention had been greeted with great suspicion by Peter Cashin, a delegate from St. John’s. He was the most popular anti-Confederate, a political maverick and a former member of pre-Commission of Government cabinets, but a leader lacking the confidence of the Water Street merchants. Cashin viewed the British action in setting up the Convention as a breach of faith; the British Government should have restored Newfoundland to its pre-1934 constitutional status of Responsible Government once the war had ended in 1945. Cashin and his supporters used the Convention to embarrass the Commission of Government and to agitate for the restoration of Responsible Government.\textsuperscript{69}

The fact that Cashin decided to seek and win a seat in the National Convention gave the political process a credibility that otherwise would have been denied the British Government had Cashin boycotted the Convention process. The National Convention, and critics such as Cashin having been elected, the first objective of British policy had been achieved, historian Peter Neary has commented because the “Convention’s legitimacy was accepted.”\textsuperscript{70} The anti-Confederate newspaper columnist Albert Perlin welcomed the Convention as representing the last chance to get the kind of information, he optimistically noted on June 29, 1946, “on which alone the people of Newfoundland can make up their minds soundly and wisely about their future government and their prospects of advancement economically and socially.”\textsuperscript{71}

### The “Moment of Truth” in the National Convention

The National Convention met on September 11, 1946 and dissolved on January 30, 1948.\textsuperscript{72} The Commission of Government closely controlled the financial and procedural parameters under which the National Convention functioned. The Commission controlled the budget, approved all expenses and determined what “advisers, officers and servants” the Convention could hire. Having the right to appoint the Chair of the Convention, the Commission agreed with the first Chair, Supreme Court Justice Cyril Fox, that no Commissioner would be called to appear before the Convention in public session to give information and explain government policy. The Convention would be allowed to question Commissioners and their staff only in camera before committees of the Convention.\textsuperscript{73}

Delegates did have the benefit of two major background documents on Newfoundland. The first was a report on Newfoundland’s financial and economic situation prepared by officials of the Dominions Office. The second was the publication in 1946 of a collection of academic essays edited by Robert MacKay of Dalhousie University who had been seconded to the Canadian Department of External Affairs to help with Canadian planning on Newfoundland’s joining the Confederation.\textsuperscript{74} The collection included three contributions on Newfoundland’s external relations by historian Allan Fraser of Memorial University College.
The Convention divided into nine investigative committees on September 18, 1946 to study various aspects of Newfoundland affairs. The subjects were fisheries, public health, education, agriculture, finance, forestry, local industries, mining, and transportation and communications. The subsequent reports gave Newfoundlanders a focus on local problems and an agenda for future action. From the British point of view, the reports were “harmless, if somewhat windy, and at times, ungrateful and wrong-headed exercises, that allowed some steam to be vented politically without threatening either normal Commission rule or their own grand design” of Confederation with Canada.

On October 28, 1946 Smallwood made what was later termed by fellow delegate Michael Harrington a speech that was a “moment of truth” because further deliberations of the Convention were influenced by the Confederation issue. What delegates said or did would be viewed from either Confederation and self-government perspectives regardless of whether delegates had publicly declared their true intentions. It “injected bitterness, suspicion and acrimony” and “created clear divisions where none existed before.” Smallwood unsuccessfully attempted to have the Convention approve a resolution that would send a delegation from the Convention to Ottawa to ascertain what terms of union Canada might be willing to offer Newfoundland. Smallwood introduced a motion which earlier had been suggested by Convention Chair Fox on October 1 at a meeting of the Convention’s steering committee. Cashin opposed the suggestion as outside the Convention’s jurisdiction, while Bradley thought that it was best to examine Newfoundland’s financial and economic prospects. Smallwood’s October 28 resolution was allowed by the Convention Chair and sanctioned by its British-appointed constitutional expert despite his failure to provide notice of motion for the resolution.

Two days later in Ottawa the Canadian government agreed to receive a delegation from the Convention if one were sent and appointed a committee of high-profile cabinet ministers “to consider and advise government on questions relating to Newfoundland and to supervise the work of the interdepartmental committee.” This interdepartmental committee of senior federal servants chaired by Robert MacKay had first met in May 1946 to prepare detailed information on Newfoundland in anticipation of any negotiations with Newfoundland officials for possible terms of union. The Canadians would be ready; it was a matter for the Newfoundlanders to come to Ottawa.

It is generally acknowledged by historians that Smallwood introduced the resolution to stake out the leadership of the Confederation issue for himself. The decision by the Commission of Government to allow the Convention’s proceedings to be broadcast over the government radio station, Broadcasting Corporation of Newfoundland, worked to his advantage. His public speaking ability, honed by years of participation in debating clubs, electioneering, and as the host of the popular Barrelman radio program from 1937 to 1943, enabled him to speak beyond the Convention delegates to the people of the outports bringing the messianic word of Confederation. “At one stroke,” historian Peter Neary writes of the resolution, “Smallwood had succeeded in pushing himself to where he liked to be and would long remain – in the limelight at centre stage. In short order he had become the Convention’s lightning rod, a figure upon whom the Newfoundland conservative social and economic elite would heap their scorn but whom they would not soon silence. The country at last had a leader in the making but one decidedly not to the taste of the comfortable upper class.” Smallwood would become a Confederate political leader that all would have to come to accept if reluctantly – the British...
government, the Canadian government and the Newfoundland economic and political elite. This motion was defeated on November 5 by a vote of 25 to 17 and the Convention agreed to delay any action to send a delegation to Ottawa until the completion of the committee reports.86

**Success at Last**

Smallwood had more success with a Confederation resolution in February 1947. On February 4, R.B. Job moved that the Convention ascertain what economic and fiscal relationships could be obtained between Newfoundland and the United States, between Newfoundland and Britain, and between Newfoundland and Canada. Job had included the Canadian option in the resolution to secure Smallwood’s support for his own preference, closer economic relations with the United States. Smallwood agreed that the Convention should send a delegation to the United States to find out what economic and fiscal relationship the Americans might be willing to offer Newfoundland in a special tariff arrangement.87 The Convention on February 4, 1947 passed a resolution that delegates be sent to Britain and Canada, and the United States for these purposes. The resolution stated that a committee of the Convention would be appointed to discuss with the Commission of Government as to how the delegates would proceed to acquire the necessary information from the three governments. This committee would report back to the Convention before any delegation left Newfoundland.88

The committee included Bradley, Smallwood and St. John’s Convention members Job, Chesley Crosbie and Gordon Higgins. The Commission remained true to British policy and informed the committee that, with regard to the proposed delegation to the United States to discuss fiscal and trade matters, this was a matter “for negotiation between governments through the regular diplomatic channels. 89 While not supportive of a delegation to London, the Commission agreed to recommend to the Dominions Office that a delegation be sent. However, there was a caveat. The Convention delegation would have to provide in advance what enquiries in detail it wished to request of the Dominions Office. This approach, according to historian Peter Neary, effectively would “prevent the British from being put in the witness box, just as the Commission was safeguarded.”90 In its consistency, the Commission would approve a delegation to Ottawa as long as the subject would be Confederation and not fiscal, political and economic matters which were “entirely for discussion between governments.”91

The National Convention approved two resolutions on February 28: first, to send a delegation to London; and, then, a delegation to Ottawa following the return of the London delegation. Both delegations were chaired by Bradley.

**The London Delegation**

The British preference for Confederation was evident in a meeting the new British High Commissioner to Canada, the newly knighted Sir Alexander Clutterbuck had with senior officials of the Canadian Department of External Affairs on March 5, 1947. Clutterbuck reconfirmed his government’s commitment to the Confederation choice and wanted the
Canadians to be as precise as possible with regard to the Terms of Union. Another subject was Newfoundland’s sterling debt, which Britain would be willing to assume once Newfoundland became a Canadian province and which earned Britain more than $3 million Canadian in annual interest. This was the price, historian David MacKenzie has observed, that the “British were willing to pay to have the Canadians take Newfoundland (and its potential future deficits) off their hands.” As High Commissioner to Canada, Clutterbuck’s appointment can only be seen, as Peter Neary has suggested, as insurance in Ottawa “to complete the Newfoundland deal.”

The London delegation left Newfoundland on April 25, 1947 and consisted of Bradley, Peter Cashin, Malcolm Hollett, Chesley Crosbie, Albert Butt, Pierce Fudge and William Keough. Bradley and Keough were the only Confederate delegates among the group. The delegation held four meetings with the Dominions Office representatives who had carefully prepared responses to the questions the delegates were required to submit in advance of the meetings. The delegates sought answers on Britain’s future support for Newfoundland and on this matter, the British made it clear that their ability to help was severely limited. If Newfoundlanders chose Responsible Government, then Newfoundland would have to assume full responsibility for its finances without any British assistance. If they chose Commission of Government, then the British would continue to provide for Newfoundland’s “financial stability.”

The delegates also informed the British that the referendum which the Dominions Office hoped to hold in the autumn of 1947 should have only two options – Commission and Responsible Government. On this matter, Dominions Office Secretary Lord Addison replied that it was the responsibility of the National Convention to make whatever recommendations it wished to him on the possible future forms of government. He left the impression with the delegates that the British government reserved the right to decide what choices would ultimately be on the referendum and, to the delegates, this implied that Confederation would not be excluded as an option.

Cashin and his fellow anti-Confederates returned to Newfoundland bitter and disappointed with the indifference of the British government. The trip was in the words of historian David MacKenzie “an exercise in public relations” on the part of the Dominions Office. Speaking in the National Convention on May 19, Cashin claimed that ‘there is in operation at the present time a conspiracy to sell, and I use the word ‘sell’ advisedly, this country to the Dominion of Canada.”

**The Long Hot Summer in Ottawa**

The delegation to Ottawa left on June 19 and arrived five days later on June 24 to a warm welcome and a dinner that evening tendered by Prime Minister King. Present for the dinner was the newly knighted Sir Peter Clutterbuck. The delegation consisted of Confederates Bradley, Smallwood, Thomas Ashbourne, Charles Ballam, and the Rev. Lester Burry and anti-Confederates Pleman Crummey and Gordon Higgins. Bradley anticipated that the delegation’s work would take only two weeks and the National Convention would reconvene about the middle of July.
The Canadians were well-prepared to negotiate proposed Terms of Union. Senior officials at the Department of External Affairs were committed to Confederation, but Prime Minister King’s ardour of October 1946 had waned considerably since. King’s cautiousness resulted from concerns over offering more favourable terms that the other Maritime provinces would want as well. Canada was also reluctant to offer Terms of Union which later would have to be renegotiated by another delegation from Newfoundland. Thus, Canada had decided prior to the arrival of the Newfoundland delegation not to make a firm and detailed offer of terms. Canada changed its mind however as a result of representations of the Canadian High Commissioner to Newfoundland, Scott Macdonald, and worked with the delegation to put together an offer based on proposed terms.

The Canadian committee had put together a cost benefit analysis of what Confederation would mean for Canada. On the positive side, Newfoundland would round out the Canadian nation from “sea to sea”, thus fulfilling the dream of the Fathers of Confederation in 1867. Newfoundland was Canada’s eighth largest customer of its goods and Confederation would increase the average annual worth of the Newfoundland market from $25 million to about $40 million. Newfoundland would also provide Canada with substantial fisheries, forest, mineral and hydro-electric resources, especially in Labrador. With Confederation, Canada would no longer have to worry about its defence and civil aviation rights in Newfoundland and whether an independent Newfoundland would use the American presence to extract future concessions from Canada. On the negative side, the annual cost to the Canadian treasury of financial assistance to the new provincial government would be about $15 million.

The first meeting between a Canadian committee of cabinet ministers chaired by Louis St. Laurent and the Newfoundland delegation took place on June 25. While the Canadians were well-fortified with expert officials from various departments, the Newfoundland delegates were left to themselves. Smallwood served on all of the 11 committees established by the two sides and generally took the lead in the discussions with the Canadians. Much of the initial work involved the Canadians responding to various questions from the Newfoundlanders with Bradley and Smallwood appearing to want to drag out the negotiating process. It has been suggested by some historians that this delaying process was to postpone any referendum due for late 1947 in order to allow the Confederates more time to sell the benefits of Confederation to voters.

Prime Minister King’s caution not to rush Confederation talks reflected Canadian public opinion. A Gallup Poll released in July 1947 asked a representative sampling of Canadians the question, “Do you think Canada should invite Newfoundland to become the 10th province, or not?” Forty-nine per cent replied yes as compared to 57 per cent who said yes a year earlier to a similar poll question.

In late July both sides got down to drafting possible Terms of Union. The anti-Confederate members were upset over the Canadian decision to offer draft terms and along with their supporters in the Convention tried to have the delegation recalled from Ottawa. Bradley rejected calls for their return, asserting they were within their terms of reference and continued discussions with the Canadians. On July 24 Bradley told a St. John’s newspaper that a basis for union was at hand and the talks would soon end. Smallwood and MacKay of External Affairs began the process of drafting the final Terms of Union that the delegation would bring to Newfoundland for consideration by the National Convention.
The death of Frank Bridges on August 10 upset the schedule to complete draft terms so that the Newfoundlanders could return home. Bridges was a member of the Canadian negotiating committee and the New Brunswick representative in the federal cabinet. Ottawa declined to approve any agreement until a by-election was held and New Brunswick once more had representation in the cabinet. Prime Minister King wanted any Terms of Union to be approved by his cabinet which had representation from all nine provinces. “King’s principle, in other words, was that while the existing provinces need not be consulted, the final decision would have to be taken by a cabinet in which each province had a well-established representative,” Neary writes.106

The delegates debated whether to stay in Ottawa until the by-election was held or return to Newfoundland without the draft terms. While this discussion ensued, the Responsible Government delegates worked in co-operation with their colleagues in the National Convention to have a telegram sent to Bradley demanding that the delegation return immediately. The protesters declared that Bradley’s negotiations with the Canadians was beyond the terms of reference for the delegation and thus unauthorized. Bradley denied the claim and asserted the protesters were simply playing party politics which was “nothing short of national treachery.”107

Bradley then decided that the delegates had finished their business in Ottawa and that the work of the National Convention should resume. The delegates left Ottawa on September 30; in the end, the Canadians ensured that the Confederate delegates would not return empty-handed. They returned with a history of their negotiations, several appendices of information about the Canadian federal system, answers to questions raised by the delegates and a promise that the draft Terms of Union would be sent later.108 These reports had black covers and quickly became known as the “Black Books.”

Appealing Over the Heads of the Convention Delegates

The Ottawa delegation arrived back in St. John’s on October 4 and the National Convention reconvened on October 10. Smallwood tabled the Black Books and informed the Convention that draft Terms of Union were forthcoming from the Canadian government for its consideration. The anti-Confederates attempted to censure Bradley for having carried out extensive negotiations with the Canadians, but Bradley headed off this action by resigning as Chair leaving the Convention in confusion. The Commission of Government filled the Chair by appointing St. John’s lawyer John McEvoy to replace Bradley. McEvoy had been a former student109 in the early 1930s of Robert MacKay of the Canadian Department of External Affairs when MacKay had been a political science professor at Dalhousie University.

On November 6 Smallwood introduced Canada’s preferred Terms of Union to the National Convention for debate, which the Responsible Government supporters unsuccessfully failed to prevent. Smallwood and Confederation dominated the proceedings of the Convention until December 12 when the Responsible Government supporters successfully adjourned deliberations for the Christmas holidays. The Convention reconvened on January 5, 1948 when debate resumed again on Confederation. Robert Job spoke on January 15 putting forward the Responsible Government view that Newfoundland should either return to Responsible
Government or Commission of Government and then negotiate a better deal with Canada than the one being proposed by Smallwood and his Confederate colleagues. “And there would then be an opportunity for those who favour Confederation to form a party,” Job said, and contest the issue. If the Confederation party were elected, they would then be in a position to pursue negotiations for Confederation.”10 In any case, Newfoundland should investigate all its options before choosing Confederation.11

The Confederate sojourn in Ottawa and the Canadian draft Terms of Union were critically condemned by the anti-Confederate press. Albert Perlin of the St. John’s Daily News believed that Smallwood’s proposed budget underestimated both revenue and expenditure needs under Confederation and that Canadian revenue estimates were similarly incorrect. That the Canadian financial terms were probably not the best that could be obtained from Canada, Perlin believed, proved the Responsible Government assertion that such negotiations could only best be carried out between two sovereign governments. Such negotiations could then be handled with the help of expert advisers on both sides. “Any other way would be a betrayal of the national interest,” Perlin declared on September 10, 1947 “not alone of the interest of those now living but also of the interests and the rights of posterity.”12

Perlin naturally disapproved of Smallwood’s ad hoc manner in seeking Terms in mid-1947 from the Canadians. Not only had Smallwood sat on most of the committees involved with these negotiations, but he did so without the assistance of adequate Newfoundland experts. “At almost all these meetings the Canadian government was fortified by the presence of technical advisers,” he commented on October 17, 1947 “while at some times the Newfoundland delegation found itself compelled to postpone the consultations while statistical information was procured from the government in St. John’s.”13 It was hardly comforting to the people, he noted on December 10, 1947 that Smallwood regarded his delegates as “clod-hoppers” in describing their expertise in comparison to their Canadian counterparts. Since clod-hoppers were “clumsy, awkward boors,” Smallwood’s admission, Perlin continued, was “itself adequate proof of the importance of confronting the Canadian experts with men on our side of equal ability and with full official credentials... Nothing can be left to chance and that is the whole purport of our argument against the methods now employed to force union on the people.”14

On January 19, 1948 St. John’s delegate Gordon Higgins moved that the Convention recommend to the British Government that the choices on the forthcoming referendum be between “Responsible Government as it existed in Newfoundland prior to its suspension in 1934” and the present Commission of Government system. The motion passed unanimously on January 22.15 The following day Smallwood moved that the referendum ballot include the Confederation option based on the proposals from the Canadian government tabled in the Convention on November 6, 1947. On January 23, 1948 Convention delegates by a vote of 29 to 16 defeated Smallwood’s motion.16 The Convention closed on January 30; the real political fight had yet to start.

The 29 Dictators: Pushing Against an Open Door

The Convention vote gave the Confederates an opportunity to mobilize their support. Smallwood was now the public face and voice and leader of the Confederate cause. He and
Bradley quickly took the offensive charging that the 29 delegates were “29 dictators” who denied the people the right to choose the form of government they wanted. Bradley appealed to the population through a radio broadcast that they immediately demonstrate their protest against the dictators by petitioning the Governor to have Confederation included as an option on the ballot paper. Smallwood made a similar appeal the following day. The response was immediate and in just over a week Smallwood had obtained 1,550 telegrams containing over 44,000 signatures. Historian James Hiller regards this effort as the real start of the Confederate referendum campaign since “the telegrams provided valuable information about the extent and location of Confederate support.” On February 21 the Confederate Association was established; Bradley was its President and Smallwood the General Secretary and Campaign Manager.

Smallwood’s appeal to the British government through the Governor found a receptive audience; in fact, “though he did not know it,” Peter Neary writes, “Smallwood was pushing against an open door.” Having consulted government officials in St. John’s and Ottawa, the British government announced on March 11 three choices on the forthcoming referendum ballot. As they finally appeared they were the following: “1. COMMISSION OF GOVERNMENT for a period of five years”; “2. CONFEDERATION WITH CANADA”; “3. RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT as it existed in 1933.” The British justified their decision because of the considerable debate Confederation had been given in the National Convention based on the proposed draft Terms of Union offered by the Canadian government. As there were three choices on the ballot, the British declared one of the three had to receive majority support from voters, with the option receiving the least number of votes being dropped from the ballot for a second referendum vote.

The Canadian government signaled its desire to downplay any influence it might have in the forthcoming referendum campaign by appointing a more junior member of External Affairs as Acting High Commissioner to Newfoundland. Historian David MacKenzie writes that “if the Canadians had any clear policy during the referendum campaigns, it was to be seen to be doing absolutely nothing to affect the decision.” The Canadian government felt that Paul Bridle rather than Scott Macdonald could better maintain “a low profile in St. John’s, while allowing the Canadians to allow a degree of influence, both politically and financially, to help secure a successful outcome.”

The Responsible Government League and Wayfarer

Supporters of Responsible Government had formed the Responsible Government League on February 11, 1947 with St. John’s businessman Francis O’Leary as President. The League included businessmen, prominent lawyers, other professionals and some labour leaders from St. John’s, but had excluded any members of the National Convention and especially Peter Cashin whom the economic and political elite regarded as a rabble rouser. The League wanted a return to the Responsible Government system as had existed prior to the establishment of the Commission of Government. Despite its establishment, the League did little to actively promote its cause until the dissolution of the Convention in 1948. The result was that, as historian James Hiller has observed, “a unified, professional and aggressive campaign in favour of the restoration government, which could have blocked Confederate manoeuvres, never
merged.” Early on, the League had believed that the options on the referendum, which the Dominions Office had hoped to hold in May 1947, would be between retention of Commission of Government and Responsible Government, an assumption based on the minority support in the Convention for Confederation. The League, Hiller asserts, badly misjudged British intentions in this and other issues.\(^{125}\)

The Responsible Government League was a loose organization of people united by their common opposition to Confederation, and, during the referenda campaigns of 1948, never had the strong organizational and financial support of their Confederate counterpart.\(^{126}\) It had the general support of Roman Catholics, who feared the loss of the denominational school system. Roman Catholics, many of whom were of Irish origin, had played a critical role in the mid-19th century in the attainment of Responsible Government and had developed over the following century a strong sense of Newfoundland nationhood they were reluctant to give up.\(^{127}\)

Unlike the Confederation forces, those wanting the restoration of Responsible Government never coalesced around one central leader. In fact, as their chief protagonist, Smallwood later noted they had “many leaders, but not one whose leadership they were all prepared to follow. Their cause was thus never a united front, and they never had united strategy.”\(^{128}\) Generally, those opposed to Confederation have been portrayed as simple romantics and reactionary merchants fearful of stiff competition from Canadian business. As Don Jamieson, a member of the Economic Union Movement with the United States, later noted, their case rested on a “strange mixture of hard-headed realism and deep-rooted emotions.”\(^{129}\)

The League’s most articulate member and voice was St. John’s businessman and journalist Albert Perlin, whose *Daily News* column espoused the Responsible Government perspective and raised serious concerns about arguments of the Confederation side.\(^{130}\) Smallwood, a life-long friend of Perlin, later considered him to have been the intellectual force behind the Responsible Government movement. Writing in his 1973 autobiographical *I Chose Canada*, he credited Perlin with being “the clever source of every last sensible argument that ever surfaced in the anti-Confederate Campaign.”\(^{131}\) The other anti-Confederate leaders, they were “ignoramuses . . . they did not know (about Confederation) and therefore what they said normally was arrant nonsense, except when they repeated the arguments that Albert Perlin originated in the *Daily News*.” Expectedly, Smallwood qualified his comments with the assertion that the Responsible Government arguments were weak and the best his political opponents could put forward.\(^{132}\)

A student of both Newfoundland history and world affairs, Perlin strongly promoted a return to Responsible Government and appealed to the public to give serious consideration to the issue of Confederation and not let themselves be swayed by rhetoric alone. Opposition to Confederation meant more than refusal to support a political union with Canada. Responsible Government meant the opportunity to determine one’s own destiny in one’s own way, the democratic way. “It gives to us, the people of Newfoundland,” Perlin commented on April 22, 1948, “the means to suit our policies to our needs and even to change the form of government to suit those needs.”\(^{133}\) In a rational and logical manner, Perlin constantly asked his readers to examine the total impact Confederation would have on the Newfoundland society and economy. “Clear and dispassionate analysis of the facts, all the facts, relevant to Confederation,” he wrote on May 9, 1946, “is a clear necessity.” He argued that while Confederation might in the long run be the best political course for Newfoundlanders to adopt, “the facts will do that and the flowing streams of passionate rhetoric are quite unnecessary unless the facts are against
the Confederates.” Perlin hoped that reason would triumph over emotion in the fight for the minds and hearts of Newfoundlanders in the constitutional debate.

Perlin in his columns attempted to dispel the public’s perception, which Smallwood reinforced through the radio broadcast of the Convention’s proceedings, that the restoration of Responsible Government was equivalent to a return to the poverty, disease, and corruption of the pre-1934 period. “The sad part of our present situation,” he wrote on April 15, 1948, was “the growth of the myth that all our troubles were due to the kind of government we had before 1934. The Confederate leaders are trying to foster that belief.” Rather, it was “unjust to attach to government the responsibility for an economic depression of external origin and universal effect.”

Responsible Government meant the opportunity to determine one’s own destiny in one’s own way, the democratic way. To achieve this goal, it was important to Perlin and others of like mind that the Convention, especially its Finance Committee, find that Newfoundland had the natural resources to be self-supporting. “The Convention represents the last chance to get the kind of information,” he optimistically noted on June 29, 1946, “on which alone the people of Newfoundland can make up their minds soundly and wisely about their future government and their prospects of advancement economically and socially.” In November 1947, the Finance Committee, chaired by Peter Cashin, had reported that Newfoundland could indeed be self-supporting as an independent nation, and received Perlin’s full endorsement as “a practical view of the situation.” By contrast, a report commissioned by the anti-Confederate Western Star newspaper of Corner Brook and prepared by a Montreal accounting firm confirmed the suspicions of Perlin and others that the Canadian financial terms of 1947 were inadequate and would require, Perlin warned, “burdensome taxation.”

**Economic Union**

Complicating the anti-Confederate movement was strong political sentiment in St. John’s for greater economic union with the United States. On March 20, 1948 those opposed to Confederation divided into two groups with the formation by St. John’s businessman Chesley Crosbie of the Economic Union Movement. Unfortunately for this group, the American Government wanted no part of Crosbie’s group and preferred the political union of Newfoundland with Canada. As Peter Neary has observed, the Americans under the 1941 bases deal with the British Government had gotten what they wanted in Newfoundland and went along with British plans for Newfoundland’s future constitutional development.

**“Patriotism Versus Pragmatism” – Newfoundland at the Crossroads**

The date for the referendum on the three constitutional options placed before voters was June 3, 1948. The Confederates presented a formidable force as they were much better organized and funded than their opponents. Their funding came from a one dollar initiation fee, from
expatriate Newfoundlanders living in Canada, the future promise of political appointments such as the six Newfoundland senate positions, and Canadian assistance indirectly through Senator Gordon Fogo, the national director of the federal Liberal Party. Fogo directed the Confederate Association to interested Canadian companies, many of whom were brewers and distillers. The Confederates published the first issue of their successful newspaper, The Confederate, on April 7 and this newspaper stressed repeatedly the social benefits of union with Canada: the family allowance, unemployment insurance, better pensions, and a general higher standard of living. The newspaper on May 31, 1948 appealed to voters to “give yourself a chance. Give the Children a chance. Give Newfoundland a chance. Vote for Confederation and a healthier, happier Newfoundland.” To Newfoundland mothers, the Confederates promised that “Confederation would mean that NEVER AGAIN would there be a hungry child in Newfoundland. If you have children under the age of 16, you will receive EVERY MONTH a cash allowance for every child you have or may have.”

The anti-Confederates had their own newspaper, The Independent and the support of the Roman Catholic Church and the business community of St. John’s. The Independent reminded voters that “the security of the people of Newfoundland depends on just how far each Newfoundlander is prepared to use his brain and brawn to develop the natural resources of his country.” What was best for the country, stated the Monitor, the newspaper of the St. John’s archdiocese, was that option which would allow Newfoundlanders to continue “to live decently, soberly and honestly, continuing to recognize that there has grown up with us during the past four-and-a-half centuries a simple, God-fearing way of life which our forebears handed down to us, and which we must pass unmarred to posterity.” Water Street feared for the future of its local industries under Confederation, it also feared a loss of economic dominance and the prospect of increased taxation. The anti-Confederates could also play on the traditional, ingrained antipathy to Canada, and they made appeals to local patriotism, presenting themselves as the true Newfoundlanders. Those favoring economic union with the United States had to campaign under the Responsible Government banner and their cooperation with the Responsible Government League was not as smooth and unified as it could have been.

Smallwood ridiculed the wording of the Responsible Government option on the ballot which referred to the restoration of this form of government “as it was in 1933.” The Confederates exploited it to mean a “return to our grimmest days in our history”, Albert Perlin wrote on April 22, 1948 in the Daily News. Perlin denounced this frightening propaganda as “unscrupulous and unethical” and cautiously hoped that those who would vote for Confederation would do so because “they believe that it has something to offer them.” However, in a theme which he emphasized in Wayfarer columns throughout the 1940s, he acknowledged that, because the people have not been schooled in political education by the Commission of Government, there will be some “who have the least concept of political democracy who will vote against Responsible Government because they believe that ‘as it was in 1933’ means a “return to dole and suffering.”

The result of the referendum was the following: for Responsible Government (69,400) 44.55 per cent; for Confederation (64,066) 41.13 per cent; and for Commission Government (22,311) 14.32 per cent. Voter turnout was 88.36 per cent of the registered voters. Support for Responsible Government was strongest in St. John’s and on the Avalon Peninsula with a majority in eight districts. Confederates won majorities in nine districts and led the vote
in nine other districts. Despite the high concentration of Responsible Government support on the Avalon Peninsula where the Roman Catholic population predominated, the vote was regional rather than denominational, Peter Neary asserts. There were two districts on the Avalon Peninsula that had large Protestant majorities that voted for Responsible Government. Similarly, there were two districts on the west coast that had Roman Catholic majorities that voted Confederate and where there was a long tradition of close trading relations with the Canadians.148 The Commission of Government vote was now available for the taking.

The Orange Letter and the “Grievous Wound”149 of July 22, 1948

The Commission announced on June 14 that the second referendum vote would be held on July 22, 1948. The ensuing campaign was an all-out fight between supporters of Confederation and the Responsible Government option. The Confederates countered any support for economic union with the United States by emphasizing Confederation as “British Union” to discredit its backers who “would like to pull down the Union Jack and run up some other flag.”150

By comparison, some anti-Confederates played to a different prejudice, suggesting that French Canada wanted Confederation in order to get its hands on Labrador.151 They also pointed to the blatant Confederate effort to bribe the voters with the promise of the old age pension available to all Newfoundlanders over the age of 70 years. One of their more vocal female supporters was Fanny Ryan Fiander of Harbour Grace who gave several radio broadcasts and public meetings where her oratory could arouse an audience to “a high pitch of enthusiasm,” Paul Bridle informed officials at External Affairs in Ottawa. “Her ability to play on sheer emotion is superior to that of the inimitable Peter Cashin. It is perhaps a good thing for Confederation that they are the only ones of their kind in active politics.”152

The Confederates were also helped by the quiet efforts of Governor Macdonald. For example, he was a confidant of former Convention Chair John McEvoy, who in turn was in close contact with Robert MacKay of External Affairs. Macdonald, McEvoy and MacKay formed an axis of information with McEvoy serving as a discreet conduit to MacKay for information and assistance. McEvoy, a Roman Catholic, was seen generally as a Confederate leader by the Canadians and by prominent local businessmen; as such, both Bradley and Smallwood evidently were prepared to accept McEvoy as the Confederate leader to secure Canadian support and to bring the Newfoundland Commissioners on side.153

While McEvoy came out in support of the Confederate side, developing events precluded his acceptability as a leader in the protestant outports. As it had been exploited in past elections, this campaign witnessed politicians playing the sectarian card.154 In the first referendum campaign, the Monitor had strongly promoted Newfoundland’s independence and vehemently attacked Confederation.155 A newspaper account in the Sunday Herald, a newspaper owned by Geoff Stirling and a supporter of Economic Union, that Roman Catholic nuns had voted for the first time in history was widely circulated by Confederates to all the branches of the Protestant Orange Order in Newfoundland.156 A more controversial move was the sending of a circular or letter by the Grand Master of the Provincial Grand Orange Lodge of Newfoundland to all
Orangemen critical of the Roman Catholic Church’s direct involvement in the campaign and its efforts in “endeavouring to dominate Newfoundland.”

Sensing the growing appeal of Confederation among voters, the Confederate cause received a strong boost from the public declaration of support for Confederation by a number of prominent Newfoundland businessmen (including Leonard Outerbridge, Arthur Monroe and Eric Bowring), professionals (John McEvoy and Dr. William Roberts) and the two Newfoundland Commissioners of Government – Herbert Pottle and Herman Quinton). Many of the converts eventually hoped to jettison Smallwood as the Confederate leader once a majority of the voters had chosen Confederation. Pottle and Quinton had weighed into the campaign in their positions as “private citizens” by giving radio broadcasts in support of Confederation.

The Confederation option won a small majority over the Responsible Government choice, the former winning by 78,323 votes or 52.34 per cent over 71,344 or 47.66 per cent over the latter. Voter turnout was 84.89 per cent of the registered electors. The Responsible Government option carried in seven districts, all on the Avalon Peninsula, and the Confederate vote carried in the remaining districts. The Confederates successfully picked up the vote previously given in the first referendum to the Commission of Government option. The same regional voting pattern evident in the first referendum was also present in the second referendum, with the Roman Catholic vote off the Avalon Peninsula having played a significant role in the Confederate vote.

**King Says Yes**

Would Canadian Prime Minister King accept the narrow margin of victory for Confederation? Governor Macdonald wrote the Dominions Office the following day that Canada should immediately accept the referendum result and request a delegation of authorized representatives be appointed immediately to complete negotiations for Terms of Union. A copy of the letter was also sent to the British High Commissioner to Canada for King’s immediate attention. At last, while victory was now within grasp for High Commissioner Clutterbuck, King merely acknowledged the vote in a press release but refrained from any commitment until results were finalized.

King’s private secretary, Jack Pickersgill, was more enthusiastic and informed King that the margin of victory was greater than anything the Liberal Party had received in a general election since King had assumed the party’s leadership in 1921. King accepted this advice and his cabinet decided on July 27 to receive a delegation from Newfoundland to complete Terms of Union negotiations. A formal announcement from Canada and Britain was made on July 30 to this effect. Britain was delighted because its view was that “any majority for Confederation, however small” would be accepted by it. The benefits of the Canadian welfare state had tipped the balance in favour of Smallwood. Expectedly, Confederates in Newfoundland were delirious; Confederate leader Joseph Smallwood telegraphed Prime Minister King of his appreciation saying that King “will go down in history as the greatest Newfoundlander since John Cabot.”
The Canadian government sent Robert MacKay to Newfoundland on July 23 to examine the political climate in the wake of the two hard-fought and divisive referenda campaigns. In particular, he was to determine how deep the opposition was to Confederation. Responsible Government League members expressed their determination to pursue all legal and constitutional avenues. Roman Catholic opposition had been the strongest on the Avalon Peninsula where Archbishop Edward Roche was “an old and tired man averse to change” and that the church’s opposition arose partly out of financial concerns. It was the largest landlord in St. John’s and feared direct property taxation; it also feared that administratively it would report now to Canadian church officials instead of directly to Rome. It was also concerned over the “effects of North American materialism on the godly way of life of Newfoundlanders.”

MacKay confirmed the Canadian Government’s need to move quickly and positively on negotiations with Newfoundland. While the Responsible Government supporters were clearly disappointed they had lost the battle, they still hoped to win the war.

**Talks and Great Expectations, 1948**

The Commission of Government appointed Albert Walsh (Commissioner for Justice and Defence and a St. John’s lawyer) to head the delegation to Ottawa. The other members announced on August 5 were Bradley, Smallwood, Chesley Crosbie, John McEvoy, and two businessmen, Philip Gruchy (Pouch Cove-born General Manager of the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company’s pulp and paper mill at Grand Falls) and Gordon Winter (vice-president of T. & M. Winter Company). Assisting the delegates were two senior civil servants, Walter Marshall, Secretary for Finance, and Harold Puddester, Secretary for Justice, who would remain with the delegation in Ottawa until negotiations were completed. The secretary to the delegation was the Junior Assistant Secretary in the Department of Natural Resources, James Channing. Other senior servants traveled to Ottawa when their specific expertise was required. The delegation also had the services of J.C. Thompson, a senior partner with the accounting firm of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, Co. Thompson had worked in the 1930s with the Rowell-Sirois Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations. Professor Vincent MacDonald of Dalhousie University was hired as a consulting legal advisor on constitutional issues.

On the Canadian side, Louis St. Laurent who would succeed King as Prime Minister on November 15, chaired a cabinet committee. British High Commissioner Clutterbuck closely observed the negotiations from a safe distance, ready, as Peter Neary observes, to defend his country’s interests. The first meeting between the two sides began on October 6 and the Terms of Union were signed on December 11, 1948 at a ceremony held in the Senate chamber. Prime Minister King welcomed the Newfoundland delegation by saying that the “linking of the fortunes of two countries in a common destiny must always be an act of faith in the future.” For King and country, the union would be the “realization of an old dream” of forging a nation from sea to sea for Canadians.

Marshall’s and Thompson’s financial projections of the scale of transitional grants Ottawa offered in 1947 to Newfoundland showed that the assistance was inadequate and Newfoundland would be threatened with bankruptcy. It quickly became a major point of contention between the two negotiating sides with the Newfoundlanders wanting the scales
revised upward. Canada initially proved unwilling to move from its 1947 offer without upsetting its fiscal relations with the other provinces. Its usual response, James Channing later recalled, was generally “We’re sorry but we have to treat all provinces alike.” Smallwood and Walsh reportedly told British High Commissioner Clutterbuck that if the Canadians did not become “more responsive and sympathetic” then Confederation was “doomed.” If bankruptcy was to be result of the Canadian offer, Clutterbuck said that the Newfoundlanders were more willing to “go down as an independent country than as an impecunious Canadian province.”

The Canadians gave ground, agreeing to increase the 12-year sliding scale transitional grant from the original proposed amount of $26,250,000 to $42,750,000. They also assured the Newfoundlanders that Canada would later implement a promised review of Newfoundland’s finances in the most “sympathetic approach,” a promise that swayed the Newfoundlanders to accept the new financial offer. On December 11 only Chesley Crosbie refused to signed the Terms of Union; delegate Secretary James Channing remembered later that Crosbie often said during the negotiations that Newfoundland would find itself in the peculiar position of having a “prosperous population and a bankrupt government.”

Reflecting later in 1982 on these fiscal negotiations, Channing recalled that the Canadian committee and its senior officials appeared “almost as though they approached the whole issue as a contest between two diametrically opposed parties rather than, as it should have been viewed, as a joint, voluntary collaboration between two separate and independent dominions both working towards a mutually desired objective.” The Newfoundlanders were treated as if they were already a part of the federal-provincial system. “The result of the Canadian attitude, and of the failure to recognize that Newfoundland had peculiar problems that called for special treatment and handling,” Channing wrote in 1982, “could be only to perpetuate Newfoundland’s position as a backward region, and this would obviously be of no ultimate benefit either to Newfoundland or to Canada. It has always been and still is my view that the Canadian approach revealed shortsightedness and a lack of knowledge and understanding of Newfoundland’s problems.”

At the official signing of the Terms of Union on December 11, Prime Minister St. Laurent remarked that “you for Newfoundland and we for Canada, have had to do our respective bests to safeguard the interests of those whom we represent. Happily, our primary concern has not been for the narrow advantage of each but to assure our common interests in one enlarged nation. In Confederation the people of Newfoundland will share all the advantages now enjoyed by the rest of the Canadian people of whom they will then be part.” Walsh in reply said that “the signing of this important document is one of great historic significance.... its financial implications will form the basis for claims and counter-claims.... For a large number of the people of Newfoundland the union will mean many changes. While many look forward with confidence to a great future in this union, many feel that the destinies of Newfoundland could best be worked out by the people of Newfoundland themselves standing as a separate entity in the world. As in many other agreements of this kind, much depends upon the desire of both parties to make the agreement work.” As the last signature was being made, Channing later recalled that he “experienced an immediate letdown when I heard one of the attending spectators (who was not, I must emphasize, a participant in the negotiations), say to another, in a triumphant tone, ‘Well, at last we’ve got them!’”

The ceremony closed with the playing of “O Canada” but the band never had the score for the “Ode to Newfoundland” and it was not played. “In its stead and as a final gesture,
St. Laurent led a rousing three cheers for Newfoundland.”\textsuperscript{183} Observing from the sidelines, Clutterbuck was proud of his diplomatic accomplishment at last for the “errant and high-spirited son” was “at last joining the rest of the family after running wild for so long,” he wrote to the Dominions Office. While he felt that the new province might prove to be “unruly and prodigal”, Clutterbuck thought any “sacrifices and inconveniences entailed” would “be well repaid in the long run.”\textsuperscript{184}

The process for implementing the Terms of Union was an amendment to the British North America Act of 1867 and its amendments, imperial legislation that governed the creation of Canada in 1867 and the subsequent admission of the five other provinces. The Canadian Parliament approved the Terms of Union on February 17, 1949, the Commission of Government did so on February 21, 1949 and the British Parliament in turn on March 23, 1949. Newfoundland thus became the 10\textsuperscript{th} province on March 31, 1949.

**Last Ditch Efforts: Appeal to London**

While the negotiations were being successfully concluded in Ottawa, the anti-Confederates in November made unsuccessful appeals to the British House of Commons and Privy Council to have the result of the second referendum vote over-turned. The Responsible Government League had recovered from the blow of the second referendum and on September 2, 1948 launched a petition appeal for presentation to the British House of Commons asking that Responsible Government be restored and that there be no negotiations with the Canadian government “other than by representatives of a duly elected Government of the people of Newfoundland.”\textsuperscript{185} The effort was successful; on November 12 Peter Cashin, John Higgins and Frederick Marshall left Newfoundland for London with a petition containing 50,000 signatures.

The delegates complained to the Dominions Office about the behaviour of Governor Macdonald and his support of the Confederate cause but were ignored. They found a sympathetic ear in Alan Herbert, a British MP and a former member of the 1943 Goodwill Mission. Herbert tabled the petition in the House of Commons on November 23 and tabled a motion to act on the petition which would require the government to enact legislation “to restore self-government to Newfoundland, so that an election may be held in May 1949 after which the people of the Island, through their own elected Legislature and government, may determine their future, whether by way of Confederation with Canada or otherwise.”\textsuperscript{186} The British government prevented this motion coming up for debate in the Commons as it did a second attempt by Herbert in January 1949 to introduce a “Newfoundland Liberation Bill” and a similar attempt by a sympathizer in the House of Lords.\textsuperscript{187}

Failure in London in December 1948 was followed by failure in St. John’s.\textsuperscript{188} The three League delegates reported to a public meeting on the evening of December 10 of their efforts in London. A resolution was passed at the meeting demanding that the Commission of Government instruct the negotiators in Ottawa not to sign the Terms of Union. A deputation from the League, accompanied by 2,000 supporters, converged on Government House where Governor Macdonald, who was in bed, had to get up to receive the protest resolution. The governor received the protest, but refused to intervene with the official signing of the Terms
the following day. The Commission had, Peter Neary has observed, “finally slammed the door on its critics.”

The critics then tried another door through the courts. In November the League had a writ issued on behalf of six members of the last Newfoundland legislature against the governor and the Commission of Government. Success would have stopped the government’s efforts to implement Confederation. Supreme Court Justice Brian Dunfield found against the League’s action on December 13 and an appeal of his decision before Justices Edward Emerson and Harry Winter, former commissioners of government, also failed. A subsequent leave to argue the case before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council also fell short of its mark. On March 6, 1949 Governor Macdonald left Newfoundland and the administration of the country in the hands of Justice Emerson. A parting appreciation of his governorship appeared in the St. John’s Evening Telegram newspaper two days later; signed by “E.A.” and apparently in praise of Macdonald, the poem actually damned him for the “first letter of each line, read from top to bottom, formed the words ‘THE BASTARD.’”

The First Premier

Newfoundland entered the Canadian Confederation “immediately before the expiration of the thirty-first day of March, 1949.” On April 1, 1949 an official ceremony was held on Parliament Hill to welcome Newfoundland into the Confederation at a national radio broadcast with Bradley being sworn into the cabinet as Secretary of State. The carillon of the Peace Tower in Ottawa played Arthur Scammell’s “Squid Jiggin’ Ground,” and participants concluded the ceremony with the singing of “God Save the King,” “The Ode to Newfoundland,” and “O Canada.” The broadcast was listened to at Government House in St. John’s where Albert Walsh was sworn in as Lieutenant-Governor by Emerson.

Walsh appointed Smallwood on April 1 as the province’s first Premier, giving him a tremendous advantage as he led the provincial Liberal Party on May 27, 1949 to victory, winning 22 of 28 seats. For Responsible Government supporters, April 1 was a day of mourning as black drapery was hung out in St. John’s in honour of the occasion.

Contemporary Criticism: Wayfarer and the Terms of Union

Albert Perlin’s Wayfarer column in the Daily News had offered its readers a cautious and reasoned criticism of the Confederate efforts. He had been strongly critical of the Canadian proposals for political union which Smallwood brought back from Ottawa in 1947 and of the final Terms of Union negotiated in the autumn of 1948. His view was the often-repeated argument that too little was known of the effects of Confederation on the economy, especially as to how the constitutional change would, for instance, affect the local cost of living, the removal of local tariff subsidies, the transportation cost of goods from Canada, and the amount of taxes consumers would pay to both the federal and provincial governments. An independent Newfoundland, he wrote on April 21, 1948, which would be “answerable only to the people of this Island,” would be better able “to take steps to promote the popular interest by seeking
to make arrangements in the field of external relations which would be impossible if we were a province of Canada.”

Perlin was not impressed with the financial concessions the Newfoundland delegates negotiated in the final Terms of Union, specifically Term 29, which provided for the appointment of a Royal Commission within eight years from the date of union to review Newfoundland’s financial position. He was unimpressed because the overall financial provisions did not show that “Newfoundland as a province will be solvent at any time.” Any balanced budget in the early years of union, he reminded his readers on December 20, 1948, would be achieved through increased local taxation and regular drafts on the surplus, which the Commission of Government had accumulated as a result of the prosperity during the war years.

He did not think, either, that Term 29 provided much future security for the provincial government and pointed out the failure of Federal Royal Commissions, which had been appointed in the past to inquire into the social and economic conditions of the Canadian Maritimes, to produce more constructive results for the people of these three provinces. Moreover, he observed that no Canadian Government was in a “position to determine whether the recommendations of a Royal Commission to be set up in eight years time will be to the liking of the administration then in charge of Canadian affairs.” In summary, Perlin wrote on New Year’s Eve, 1948, “the financial arrangements are inadequate and may lead to much future trouble and even suffering.”

Contemporary Academic Assessments

In 1949 academic reflections on Confederation tended to support Confederation. The academic magazine, Canadian Forum, highlighted the general views of Canadians. In its September 1948 issue it extolled the benefits of union for both countries. For Newfoundland, it was improved living standards associated with the Canadian welfare state. Canada acquired “one of the world’s greatest fishing grounds and a growing wood pulp and paper industry. Perhaps more important, inland Labrador contains an iron ore field believed to be as rich and much more extensive than the fabulous Mesabi deposits in Minnesota. Canada will also strengthen her strategic defences and will gain very important bases.” Such views have been echoed in subsequent Canadian historical surveys, the general view of Canadian historians being best reflected that of Donald Creighton in 1976 who judged the Terms of Union as “generous.” A 1981 history of Canada since 1945 portrayed the union as having “dragged the province out of the isolation of centuries.”

Newfoundland in the late 1940s did have some native-born academic expertise that could have assisted the delegates in their negotiations with Canada over the final terms of union, but were not involved. One individual was political scientist Bert Mayo who had completed a doctoral thesis in 1948 at Oxford University on the implications of Newfoundland’s political union with Canada. Mayo studied at Dalhousie University in the early 1930s, worked for the Commission of Government in the late 1930s, served in the Canadian air force during the Second World War, and then studied at Oxford. His thesis examined federal-provincial relations in Canada and analyzed the possible economic, social and financial impacts of Confederation. Mayo’s assessment, historian David Alexander wrote in 1977, was done with a “brutal clarity.
which is difficult for a native to accomplish and which would be regarded as offensive if done by one who was not.” Mayo dismissed the notion of economic union with the United States as unrealistic and that an independent state could only provide a low standard of living. Confederation would not bring economic benefits because, in the words of Alexander, “in the economist’s sense of that word” the two countries were competitors in resource production. “There would be some secondary economic benefits,” Alexander summarized Mayo, “arising from the lowering of Newfoundland’s tariff barriers and hence its cost of living, and from access to the superior economic and technical services of the Canadian government.”

Mayo’s conclusion, written before the referenda campaign results, was that the “future of Newfoundland is not particularly auspicious, whether the country remains independent or becomes a Canadian province. The only real difference from a social and economic point of view is that, with Newfoundland a province, the Canadian connection would guarantee some alleviation of the otherwise intolerably low standard of living. But Confederation would not work miracles – unless old age pensions and family allowances may be called by that name.” Mayo’s thesis had little impact on the Confederation debate one way or the other, Alexander observed, but it did emphasize what would be Confederation’s main beneficiary, the improvement in the social welfare and public health of the population and removed the boundaries that enabled people to move to the mainland for employment.

A differing view was presented by another young Newfoundland political scientist, Moses Morgan who had joined Dalhousie University in 1948 following graduate work at Oxford University. In 1949 he published an article on Confederation in the Queen’s Quarterly which criticized a referendum as inappropriate for constitutional change because the “ordinary voter cannot be expected to grasp the important issues involved and is liable to be influenced by factors quite irrelevant to the issue under consideration.” What should have happened, even though he felt Confederation was probably the best choice for Newfoundland, was that “Responsible Government should have been restored and the question should have been submitted to the country for a decision.”

Recognizing the irrevocable nature of the referendum vote and the inevitability of Confederation, Albert Perlin (who wore a black tie on April 1, 1949) in early 1949 in his Wayfarer columns implored his readers to accept the forthcoming union and to work towards becoming good Canadians. He hoped that the bitterness associated with the 1948 referenda campaigns would not continue with the constitutional change in 1949. One way of preventing this from occurring, he wrote on March 11, 1949, was for the Canadian government to appoint a provisional provincial government consisting of both the victor and the loser, a “non-partisan regime, composed of able citizens above the reproach of petty partisanship.” He acknowledged that this would probably not happen, that Smallwood’s claims that he would form the first cabinet were probably true. Yet, how Canada dealt with this matter, he commented on April 1, 1949 the day after Newfoundland formally became a tenth province of Canada would set “the standard of future political development and on what is done and how will depend the respect that a great many Newfoundlanders are going to hold or lose for the present Prime Minister of the great dominion to which, for better or for worse, we are now bound in perpetuity.”
Generous Benefactor or Mixed Blessings Since 1949?

Until 1974, anniversary dates for Newfoundland’s entry into the Canadian Confederation have been occasions for celebrations of the historic event in keeping with Premier Smallwood’s domination of provincial politics from 1949 to 1972. The 10th anniversary in 1959 took place against the background of the province’s confrontation with Ottawa because of differences over Term 29 and a loggers’ strike concerning Ottawa’s refusal to provide federal police.211 Writing in the Atlantic Advocate in April 1959, Albert Perlin praised the social impact of the welfare state over the first decade, but still believed better Terms of Union could have been negotiated. It had become clear that the 1948 delegation had failed “to predict with accuracy the financial consequences of union.” Instead, the “people of Newfoundland had voted without a thorough grasp of the financial implications and the majority had simply expressed an abiding faith in Canada’s generosity and good intentions. Yet, the effect, as someone said at the time, was to pass over the deeds of one’s house to a buyer and, after he had acquired possession, rely on his sense of justice to give a good price.”212

In 1964 the 15th anniversary was celebrated with publications showing the “progress” the province had made. One manifestation of this progress was the publication in 1966 of a collection of articles documenting the changes since 1949. In his foreword to the book, Premier Smallwood triumphantly proclaimed that “a revolution has swept Newfoundland... Swift improvements in our education, health, transportation and communication facilities have set the stage for further economic growth: new schools, a new university, new colleges of technical training, new hospitals and new paved highways now span the Province.”213 Perlin wrote that the “old argument of whether or not union with Canada was right for the province to take,” was “all but dead and forgotten. At best, it is a useless argument because all its propositions must be retrospective and hypothetical; and in any event the issue is over and done with. The fact is that Newfoundland is today a Canadian province, and the only question worth discussion is whether or not she has made the best of the situation, and if she has benefited from Confederation as much as was expected.”214

On the 25th anniversary of political union in 1974 Perlin considered Confederation to have “turned out a whole lot better than anyone could have expected 25 years ago.... it was plain to any serious student of Newfoundland’s political and economic history that we could not stand alone and hope to achieve a stable prosperity and a tolerable level of public and social services. There may still be some who will give me an argument on this but the fact remains that national security and fiscal aid are today the major props of our present living standard and a principal source of our necessary social capital.”215

Increasingly, the annual anniversary of Confederation since 1974 have been occasions for serious reflections on the advantages and disadvantages of Newfoundland’s place in Confederation as the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador became embroiled in legal and jurisdictional disputes with the Government of Canada over development of the province’s natural resources such as hydro-electricity, fisheries and offshore minerals. These disputes have highlighted the province’s ineffective political clout in Confederation, political powerlessness portrayed in the 1977 public presentations to the public hearings in St. John’s of the Task Force on Canadian Unity.216 As historian David Alexander told the Task Force in 1977, “the people of Newfoundland, like the people of Quebec, know their ‘nation’, but are uncertain of their country.” Such uncertainty became manifested in the policies of the government of Premier
Brian Peckford of the 1980s, whose various policy positional papers stressed the importance to Newfoundlanders and Labradorians of “Managing All Our Resources.”

To celebrate the 50th anniversary of Confederation, the Federal and the Provincial Governments sponsored a three-day conference in 1999 which brought together distinguished academics, journalists, and business and community leaders to “explore, debate and celebrate Canada at the dawn of the new millennium and Newfoundland and Labrador’s place within the Canadian federation.” A brief summary of the conference proceedings was subsequently issued, entitled “History in the Making.” The participants provided a lively discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of Confederation on the province, with several speakers examining how the province needed to have better administrative and fiscal arrangements with the Federal Government over the development of the province’s natural resources.

The Newfoundland Historical Society had sponsored a different forum on the impact of Confederation 10 days earlier. Entitled Encounters with the Wolf and well-attended, the symposium’s two-day sessions were marked by spirited and emotional debate that concluded with a formal dinner with participants holding a straw vote which went strongly in favour of the Responsible Government option. One participant at the symposium was 91-year old Grace Sparkes, a former journalist and opponent of Confederation during the 1948 referendum campaigns. Sparkes in 1999, as she had in the late 1940s, was steadfast in her view that there had been a conspiracy between Canada and Great Britain to put Newfoundland into Confederation. She wrote “dozens of speeches” for male speakers as she travelled around the Island holding public meetings. She recalled in 1999 that “many women favoured the idea of Confederation. I wondered sometimes how much they were influenced by the prospect of being able to buy duty free goods from the Eaton catalogue.” Women played an important role in the referenda vote, but their voices have still gone unnoticed in the recorded history of the period.

A popular celebration of Confederation in 1999 witnessed the publication of a collection of essays entitled Fifty Golden Years edited by James Thoms, a former associate of Premier Smallwood. The publisher was Geoffrey Stirling, once an advocate for Economic Union in the 1940s and a supporter of Confederation after 1949. Thoms’s view was that “Confederation has been good in large part, very, very good for most people in Newfoundland and Labrador, especially in getting rid of the long, long years of social poverty and deprivation. In other aspects they have been bad, very, very bad years, especially in the preservation and development of one of the greatest storehouses of natural resources in the world. No one in those 50 years was able to strike the right balance for what had to be done.” The book’s writers provided a balanced perspective by supporters and opponents of Confederation in the 1940s, some of whom “didn’t like the way it was done” but acknowledged that overall Confederation has been beneficial for the province despite the tragic development of its natural resources.

**Conclusion**

“The United Kingdom led, Canada followed, and Newfoundland consented.” In one brief sentence, historian Peter Neary summarized the events that shaped Newfoundland’s political and constitutional fate. The United Kingdom and Canada each naturally acted in their national interests in the matter by preparing the political stage and quietly influencing its actors.
The events of the late 1940s were finely orchestrated by the United Kingdom and Canada to produce an outcome that was legally and constitutionally correct and which Newfoundlanders and Labradorians freely voted for in the July 22, 1948 referendum. Their delegates also had the right to accept or reject the final Terms of Union, as one delegate, Chesley Crosbie, did refuse to sign.

Indeed, the Confederate margin of victory in Newfoundland in 1948 was slim but it was a majority option of those who voted. Many people – then and now – have felt that morally, at least, they were ill-treated by a British government which bent the rules of the game to suit its needs. This viewpoint is reflected in some of the recent academic scholarship on Confederation and mirrors a variation of the Responsible Government perspective put forward by Albert Perlin, for example, that Confederation was not necessarily the wrong political option. What supporters of Responsible Government at the time and others since have argued against was the process used to achieve it rather than the actual result itself. Thus, Newfoundland should have had self-government restored first; then there would have been a general election where Confederation could have been an election issue. The negotiations for terms of union would then have been between the Canadian government and a Newfoundland government elected directly by its residents. As historian James Hiller has recently observed, “what can be justifiably criticized, however, is the decision to try and engineer Confederation without a return to Responsible Government.” In doing so, the process “deprived Newfoundlanders of a formal, definitive voice in shaping their future.”

This historiography challenges what Hiller has regarded as the “Confederate orthodoxy” whereby 1949 is seen as the beginning of Newfoundland and Labrador’s political history. “In this version,” Hiller writes, “Smallwood reads about the forthcoming National Convention in a Montreal newspaper, becomes a born-again Confederate, returns to Newfoundland and, as a result of his tireless work and skilful manoeuvres, brings about Confederation.” Smallwood presented this view in public speeches throughout his career as Premier from 1949 to 1972 and through various publications, including The Books of Newfoundland and his 1973 memoir.

What might have happened or what some might wish had happened is a matter of speculation. What Newfoundlanders and Labradorians need, historian Peter Neary has written, “is to be told the facts of history and nothing but the facts of history. More subtly, it is sometimes suggested that the right thing – Confederation – happened but in the wrong way. In this version of events, the resumption of self-government by Newfoundland would have quickly led to union with Canada in happier circumstances. All of this is, of course, highly speculative. It also flies in the face of the strong anti-Canadian rhetoric of many of the advocates of ‘Responsible Government as it existed in 1933’ and the nervousness of the Government of Canada about making a deal with Newfoundland that would stir the envy of established provinces.”

The recent scholarly work of Peter Neary and David MacKenzie has provided the detailed context to what happened at the highest levels of politicians and public officials in Newfoundland, Great Britain and Canada during the 1940s. So, too, have the edited documents published by the Canadian Department of External Affairs on Newfoundland-Canada relations between 1935 and 1949. However, more is needed to be known about the local and regional history of Newfoundland and Labrador in this period as a background to the broader story. This could include a focused research program using both documentary and oral history sources to help us understand more fully the lives of individual Newfoundlanders.
and Labradorians, men and women, especially those outside the St. John’s area. Such research might help us understand more fully the appeal of Confederation and the attraction of Canadian social services. Academic research should be encouraged in studying this important formative period in Newfoundland and Labrador history. More scholarly information is also needed about the individual participants in the Confederation story; the recent biographical profiles prepared by Memorial University Religious Studies Professor Hans Rollmann is a beginning in this direction. More research on Newfoundland and Labrador thus needs to delve into the economic, cultural, intellectual and social life of the 1940s and 1950s.228

Another area of scholarly research that is needed is in public policy. For example, the Responsible Government League asserted in the late 1940s that Newfoundland and Labrador could have survived as an independent state. No doubt, Newfoundland would have survived independently, but the real question concerns not just political survival but the quality of life that Newfoundlanders and Labradorians would have had either on their own or as a part of Canada. It is often asserted by some political commentators that the province would have been better off outside Confederation because there would have been local control over natural resources and Newfoundland and Labrador. Such views, however, belong in the realm of the “what ifs” of history.

More research should be encouraged and undertaken into the post-war period to understand what actually happened in this period and what was the province’s place within Confederation and how Federal and Provincial Government policies have shaped public policy. Newfoundlanders and Labradorians born before 1980 in particular have mixed feelings about their province’s place within Canada; a general history of the province since 1949 is missing but is desirable to help residents know how the province has evolved since giving up nationhood on 31 March 1949.

A legacy of doubt and uncertainty has lingered among many Newfoundlanders and Labradorians, both then and now, as to whether it would have been possible to negotiate better Terms of Union with Canada than what was achieved in 1948.229 While the grievance factor has enabled provincial politicians to play the “anti-Ottawa card” on occasion since 1949 – a very “Canadian” approach in the history of Ottawa’s dealings with the provinces – Newfoundland’s ongoing relations with Ottawa have been defined by efforts to improve the context of the Terms of Union with Canada. Other suggestions made over the years to improve the province’s economic status with Confederation have included an elected Senate with all provinces having equal representation and revisions to the equalization formula to give the province a greater share of the revenues from its natural resources.

In his speculation about these events of the 1940s in a 2000 convocation address to Sir Wilfred Grenfell College, Neary has commented that “Newfoundland could not have become part of Canada in any circumstances without a big political fight, so the battle that occurred and the scars that it left should not surprise.”230 How a “big political fight” would have worked itself within the confines of a restored Responsible system of government is, to say the least, speculative. Given the strong emotions embodied in the cultural and literary history of Newfoundland and Labrador since 1949, it would not have been any less vibrant and robust.231 Big political fight or not, the challenge since 1949 has been for all Canadians to craft a Confederation that in practice, if not in theory, treats all 10 provinces as equal partners. An understanding of the historical events about how Confederation happened is important to all Canadians wishing to know why Newfoundlanders and Labradorians still have a strong
sense of political grievance over their place in the Canadian nation and why the people of the province feel a need to “renew and strengthen” their place in Canada.
Endnotes


4. For this period, see Noel, Politics in Newfoundland, pp. 149-214.


6. On this period, see the following: Noel, Politics in Newfoundland, pp. 204-220; Peter Neary, “That thin red cord of sentiment and of blood: Newfoundland in the Great Depression, 1929-1934” (1988 unpublished typescript in Centre for Newfoundland Studies, Memorial University) and “‘With great regret and after the most anxious consideration’: Newfoundland’s 1932 Plan to Reschedule Interest Payments,” Newfoundland Studies 10/2 (Fall 1994), pp. 250-259; and MacKay, ed. Newfoundland. Economic, Diplomatic and Strategic Studies, pp. 64-77 and 190-196.


8. Evening Telegram, August 5, 7, 1939.


17. Herbert recounted his Newfoundland visit, first in his 1944 *Newfoundland: The Forgotten Island* and in his 1950 autobiography, *Independent Member*.


33. FitzGerald, ed., *Newfoundland at the Crossroads*, p. 99. See also his “‘The Difficult Little Island’ That ‘Must be Taken In’: Canadian Interests in Newfoundland during World War Two,” *Newfoundland Quarterly* (Spring 2001), pp. 26-27.


38. John E. FitzGerald, “‘The Difficult Little Island’ That ‘Must be Taken In’: Canadian Interests in Newfoundland during World War Two,” *Newfoundland Quarterly* (Spring 2001), p. 27.


44. See Peter Neary, “‘A more than usual ... interest’: Sir P.A. Clutterbuck’s Newfoundland Impressions, 1950,” *Newfoundland Studies* 3/2 (Fall 1987), pp. 251-254.


Hiller, *Confederation: Deciding Newfoundland’s Future, 1934 to 1949*, p. 11.


On the Gander piggery, see Smallwood, *My Brother, Joe*.


Swain, *Lester Leeland Burry*.


The Commission of Government estimated that one-quarter of the delegates were Confederates. See Neary, *Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 1929-1949*, p. 284.

successfully marshaled the desire for social and economic change in areas such as the northeast coast where William Coaker and the Fishermen’s Protective Union held political sway before 1924.


127. See John E. FitzGerald, “The Confederation of Newfoundland with Canada, 1946-1949” (MA thesis, Memorial University, 1992) and his “‘The True Father of Confederation’? Archbishop E.P. Roche, Term 17, and Newfoundland’s Confederation with Canada,” *Newfoundland Studies*, 14/2 (Fall 1998), pp. 188-219.


132. Hollohan, Albert Perlin, p. 64.


139. The history of Newfoundland’s efforts to pursue reciprocity with the United States is examined in Peter Neary and S.J.R. Noel, “Newfoundland’s Quest for Reciprocity, 1890-1910,” in Wade, ed., *Regionalism in the Canadian Community, 1867-1967*, pp. 210-226.


143. Neary, ed., *Political Economy of Newfoundland*, pp. 140-141. And benefits there would be after 1949. The Commission of Government in its last year of governing Newfoundland paid out a total of $374,000 in old age pensions; by the end of 1950 over 12,000 Newfoundlanders over 70 years of age would receive $5.3 million, and this amount, combined with family allowances and unemployment insurance, injected over $24 million into the local economy. See Blake, *Canadians at Last*, pp. 70-93.


154. Details of the second referendum campaign can be found in John E. FitzGerald, “The Confederation of Newfoundland with Canada, 1946-1949” (MA thesis, Memorial University, 1992), pp. 170-251.


160. A district by district breakdown of the vote is in FitzGerald, ed., *Newfoundland at the Crossroads*, pp. 135-136.


169. Channing, *The Effects of Transition to Confederation*, pp. 36-37. The other senior servants included the following: W.J. Carew (Secretary of the Commission); G.W.D. Allen (Assessor Taxes); R. Manning (Secretary for Public Utilities); Gordon Howell (Secretary for Customs); Raymond Gushue (Chairman, Newfoundland Fisheries Board); Dr. Leonard Miller (Department of Public Health and Welfare); W.S. Roddis (Secretary for Posts and Telegraphs); W.F. Galgay (Broadcasting Corporation of Newfoundland); D.J. Gillis (Department of Natural Resources); Herbert Russell (General Manager, Newfoundland Railway); and Capt. Martin Dalton (Marine Superintendent, Newfoundland Railway).


174. Neary, *Newfoundland in the North Atlantic World, 1929-1949*, p. 327. See also Channing, *The Effects of Transition to Confederation*, p. 42 where Channing claims “more than once Mr. Walsh let it be known that he was on the verge of departing for St. John’s.”


188. A contemporary account of events in this period is Browne’s *Eighty-four Years a Newfoundlander, Volume 1, 1897-1949*, pp. 289-337.


For further biographical information on Mayo, see MacLeod, *Crossroads Country*, pp. 97-114.


H.B. Mayo, “Newfoundland’s Entry into the Dominion,” *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, vol. 15 (November 1949), p. 510. Mayo reiterated his views in this article. He addressed the questionable process which brought Confederation about. While acknowledging there was some credibility in the notion that Newfoundland should have negotiated union from the status of an independent state, Mayo asserted that the result came from an appeal to the electorate in the “best traditions of democracy: plebiscites have been a common means of determining political destinies in the modern world. The views put forward attributing Machiavellian motives to Britain (and Canada), in prescribing a National Convention and a popular vote, appear to be sheer speculation inspired by hostility to the prospect of Confederation. There is no reason whatever to suppose that Britain was doing more than carrying out conscientiously its obligation to withdraw from Newfoundland; and since Newfoundland opinion was obviously divided, if future recriminations were to be avoided, then the responsibility had to be placed upon Newfoundlanders themselves of deciding their political future.”

In keeping with the accepted view at the time, Mayo ascribed the success of Confederation to Smallwood: “if a movement was the creation of one man it was this. Confederation was not brought to life in response to public demand, but was raised from the status of an academic issue to that of a burning national question, one which dissolved ancient loyalties and divided families and friends... No doubt he took the tide when it served, and he soon acquired allies, but nevertheless he was the prime mover.”

The story of the Newfoundland migration experience can be found in a number of publications. See, for example, Short, *Looking Through my Father’s Eyes*, and French’s *Leaving Home* and *Of the Fields, Lately*.


M.O. Morgan, “Public Affairs: Newfoundland, our Tenth Province,” *Queen’s Quarterly*, Vol. LVI, no. 2 (1949), pp. 258-267. Morgan concluded by stating that “with the passage of time Newfoundlanders will learn to enlarge their patriotism, and to become Canadians. Their deep-seated love of their country will lead them eventually to bury any resentment and to work hard for the success of this new venture. Their love of country will not be diminished, but its range and influence will be enlarged.”


Hollohan and Baker, eds., *A Clear Head in Tempestuous Times. Albert B. Perlin*, pp. 160-161, 163-165. Perlin told his readers on April 5 that his Wayfarer column had “fought for what it believed to be right and just. We have contended many times that our position was not opposition to union but rather to the methods employed to obtain it. However, the events of the past few years were “now a part of the past” and that it was the duty of all Newfoundlanders to accept this fact, because the “nourishing of grievances, however just, will in this instance, lead only to harm to ourselves, our island, and our new allegiance.” Newfoundlanders must be prepared, he continued, to learn more about Canada and, in turn, he hoped that “our new fellow citizens must not treat us as indigents beholden for the aid we are to receive, but a people willing to make an “important contribution to the strengthening of the Canadian nation.”


Albert B. Perlin, “A Decade of Confederation: A Newfoundland Editor’s Assessment,” *Atlantic Advocate* (April 1959), pp. 21, 26. Perlin asserted that Newfoundlanders were “legally Canadians but they have no sense of belonging to Canada. Nobody on the mainland has ever troubled to give them reason to acquire a spiritual affinity with other Canadians. It was simply taken for granted, if indeed it was considered at all, that once Newfoundland became a province its people would immediately assume with pride and joy the status of Canadian citizenship. That has not happened. It will not happen until good spiritual and material reasons for the adoption of a new patriotism have been supplied.”

McAllister, ed., *Newfoundland and Labrador: The First Fifteen years of Confederation*.


Albert B. Perlin, “Notes and Comments on Confederation,” *Newfoundland Quarterly*, Vol. LXX, no. 4 (Fall 1974), pp.3-5. What was true in 1974 of the province’s reliance on Ottawa for social capital is even more so in 2003.

A collection of the presentations are available in the *Newfoundland Quarterly*, vol. LXXIV, no. 1 (Spring 1978).


Thoms, ed., *Fifty Golden Years. The Illustrated History of Newfoundland and Labrador’s Union with Canada.*


227. The recent work of Memorial University religious Professor Hans Rollmann on the response of the various denominations and their leaders is an excellent departure in this direction. In 1999 Rollmann wrote a monthly column for the St. John’s *Telegram* on the role of the churches and Confederation.


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